Plea Bargaining: A Model Court Rule by Kraus, Kenneth A.
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 
Volume 4
1971 
Plea Bargaining: A Model Court Rule 
Kenneth A. Kraus 
Univeristy of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr 
 Part of the Courts Commons, Criminal Law Commons, and the Law and Society Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kenneth A. Kraus, Plea Bargaining: A Model Court Rule, 4 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 487 (1971). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol4/iss3/7 
 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
PLEA BARGAINING: A MODEL COURT RULE
I. INTRODUCTION
Criminal law and punishment in America, so we are told, exist
to serve the functions of rehabilitation, deterrence, incapacitation,
and retribution.' The system of trial by jury has traditionally been
the vehicle through which these goals are served.2 In theory, trial
by jury is an ideal system-the impartial jury of reasonable men
find the truth, while the judge guarantees protection of the defend-
ant's rights and the orderly process of the trial. In practice, with
the aid of formal rules and procedures, 3 it operates in a workable
manner. However, trial by jury is not the predominant mode of
trial in the criminal justice system today. A plea of guilty entered
by the defendant, usually pursuant to an informal agreement or
bargain with the prosecutor, constitutes the most frequent manner
of disposition of criminal cases. 4 Estimates of the number of
defendants who are convicted after pleading guilty rather than
submitting themselves to trial run from seventy-five percent to
over ninety percent. 5 It is also estimated that a very high propor-
1 Commonwealth v. Ritter, 13 PA. D. & C. 285 (Phila. Ct. of Oyer & Terminer, 1930);
see generally H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: Two ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW (1968), for a discussion of retribution and deterrence.
2 For history of the jury see M. LESSER, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE JURY
SYSTEM (1894); W. FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY (1852); regarding the jury in
criminal cases see M. LESSER, id. 134-62, and W. FORSYTH, id. 192-214.
3 E.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. and the various state criminal rules of procedure.
4
D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITH-
OUT TRIAL xiii (1966); H. SUBIN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN A METROPOLITAN COURT 44
(1966); Newman, Pleading Guilty for Considerations: A Study of Bargain Justice, 46 J.
CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 780, 788 (1956); Notes and Comments, The Role of Plea Negotiation
in Modern Criminal Law, 46 CHI-KENT L. REV. 116, 120 (1969); Note, Plea Bargain-
ing-Justice Off the Record, 9 WASHBURN L.J. 430 (1970).
5 Eighty-two percent of the criminal cases adjudicated (not including those dismissed)
and eighty-six percent of the defendants convicted and sentenced in eighty-nine U.S.
District Courts during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1968, were the result of pleas of
guilty-percentages derived by author from data provided in REPORTS OF THE PROCEED-
INGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS Table D4,
at 261; eighty percent in D.C. Court of General Sessions-H. SUBIN, supra note 4, at
12- 13; eighty-seven percent for several state and federal jurisdictions in
1964-PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 9 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE
REPORT]; eighty-three percent in Kansas district courts for the year ending June 30,
1969-Comment, Pleas of Guilty, Symposium: The American Bar Association Project On
Minimum Standards For Criminal Justice and Selected Areas of Criminal Law Revision in
Kansas, 18 KAN. L. REV. 729 (1970); approximately eighty-four percent of felony con-
victions for Cook County, 111. in 1967 - The Role of Plea Negotiation in Modern Criminal
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tion of the guilty pleas result from the informal negotiation pro-
cess and a deal with the prosecutor, rather than from a simple
guilty plea on the original charge at arraignment.
6
Several reasons are advanced to explain the gross disparity
between the number of criminal cases adjudicated by the con-
stitutionally protected method of jury trial and the overwhelming
majority determined by a plea bargain 7 and guilty plea. Perhaps
the most frequently stated rationale is that the large volume of
cases" entering the system would require an impossible aggregate
of courtroom resources to provide trial by jury to each defendant;
thus a quicker, more efficient method of case disposition is neces-
sary.9 Plea bargaining, by facilitating the prompt disposition of a
great number of cases, serves the purpose of efficiency. 10
Another reason for the great number of guilty pleas following
bargaining is the less severe sentence of which the defendant is
generally assured." First, the charge has been lowered as a result
of the bargain, and second, judges may tend to grant sentencing
concessions to defendants who plead guilty and avoid the expense
and delay of trial.12 Thus at one end of the scale is the need for
Law, supra note 4, at 116; ninety percent generally of all criminal convictions-D.
NEWMAN, supra note 4, at 3, and PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 134 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME]; ninety
percent of all criminal cases in New York City-Whitney, Bargaining on Pleas Poses
Court Problems, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1970, at 26, col. 1; over ninety percent for five
major counties in U.S. metropolitan areas (1969 felony cases)-from data in Table of
Major Dispositional Points in Felony Cases in Mclntrye & Lippman, Prosecutors and
Early Disposition of Felony Cases, 56 A.B.A.J. 1154, 1156 (1970).
6 H. SUBIN, supra note 4, at 49. Plea negotiation accounts for the majority of all felony
convictions in Cook County, Ill. -The Role of Plea Negotiations in Modern Criminal
Law, supra note 4, at 116. And 56.7 percent of the sample in Newman's survey admitted
bargaining-Newman, Pleading Guilty for Considerations: A Study of Bargain Justice,
supra note 4, at 789.
7 Because "bargain" connotes a shady or illicit deal, it may be preferable to refer to
"plea negotiation," "plea discussion," or "plea agreement." The A.B.A. prefers use of the
terms "plea discussions" and "plea agreements." See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ADVI-
SORY COMMITTEE ON THE CRIMINAL TRIAL, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON
MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF
GUILTY 3 (Approved Draft, 1968) [hereinafter cited as A.B.A. STANDARDS]. The bargain
may sometimes occur during the trial, TASK FORCE REPORT 136.
8 H. SUBIN, supra note 4, at 12; TASK FORCE REPORT 3 1-32; Enker, Perspectives on
Plea Bargaining, TASK FORCE REPORT App. A., 108, 112.
9 E.g., District attorneys in New York City admit that they must bargain and offer pleas
to lesser offenses "because the courts would collapse if they all insisted on jury trials."
Whitney, supra note 5. See also Polstein, How to "Settle" a Criminal Case, 8 PRAC. LAW.
35, 37 (1962): "The widely held opinion that prosecutors never bargain is a myth. As a
practical matter they must in order to stay in business."
10 Plea Bargaining-Justice Off the Record, supra note 4, at 433; Morris, Are Courts
Too Soft On Criminals? Probation and Plea Bargaining in Metropolitan Jurisdictions, 53
JUDICATURE 231, 233 (1970).
" PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME 135.
12 A Yale Law Journal survey of 140 federal district judges showed that eighty-seven
percent of judges who acknowledged that the plea was germane indicated that a defendant
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efficiency in the system, and at the other is the defendant who
fears the vagaries of jury trial and the possibility of much longer
sentences than the bargain has produced. Although these con-
siderations explain the prevalence of plea bargaining today, they
fail to provide convincing justification for the system.
Nevertheless, it is not the purpose of this note to discuss the
justification for the plea bargaining process, for it is clear that this
system will of necessity be continued in the foreseeable future.13
Instead, this analysis is designed first to present the functional
role, constitutional status and existing abuses in the plea bargain-
ing process, and then to discuss the goals and the proposed
standards relevant to reform of the present plea bargaining proce-
dures. The culmination of this analysis is the proposed Model
Court Rule for Plea Agreements in part III.
II. FUNCTIONAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF PLEA BARGAINING
A. Role Within the Present System-Jurisdictional Variations
The two most common types of plea arrangements or agree-
ments are the bargain concerning reduction of the charge (accep-
tance of plea to lesser included or related offense), and the bargain
involving a promise of leniency as to sentence (sentence recom-
mendations). However, because the process is informal and of
low visibility, any deal that is agreeable to both sides may be
utilized. 14 Therefore, the scope of plea arrangements is broad and
perhaps impossible to catalogue. 15 No matter what particular form
the agreement takes, however, the issue in a plea negotiation
pleading guilty to a crime was given a more lenient punishment than one who pleaded not
guilty. Comment, The Influence of the Defendant's Plea on Judicial Determination of
Sentence, 66 YALE L.J. 204 (1956). But see Katz, Municipal Courts-Another Urban Ill,
20 W. RES. L. REV. 87, 93-94 (1968).
'3 Compare Enker, supra note 8 (generally), and Fay, The "Bargained For" Guilty
Plea, 4 CRIM. L. BULL. 265 (1968), favoring the bargained guilty plea, with Alschuler, The
Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50 (1968); Myhre, Conviction
Without Trial in the United States and Norway: A Comparison, 5 HOUSTON L. REV. 647,
660 (1968), and People v. Byrd, 12 Mich. App. 186, 162 N.W.2d 777 (1968) (concurring
opinion of Levin, J.), which conclude that the practice is undesirable. See also D. NEW-
MAN, supra note 4, at 38-39, 76, 236-38; Folberg, The "Bargained For" Guilty Plea-An
Evaluation, 4 CRIM. L. BULL. 201 (1968); TASK FORCE REPORT 10; Wright, The New
Role of Defense Counsel Under Escobedo and Miranda, 52 A.B.A.J. 1117, 1120 (1966).
14 Other types of informal conviction agreements include: reduction of charge; promise
of leniency; bargain for concurrent charges; and bargain for dropped charges. Newman,
Pleading Guilty for Consideration, supra note 4, at 787. In Bongiovanni, Guilty Plea
Negotiation, 7 DUQUESNE L. REV. 542 (1969), the list includes an agreement not to seek
conviction of a higher degree of crime in exchange for defendant's not seeking to reduce
the degree. There also may be a "tacit bargain" (no negotiations) in which defendant
pleads guilty because he is aware of an established practice in the court to show leniency
to those who so plead, and he expects to be similarly treated. Enker, supra note 8, at I l.
For a general discussion of forms and uses of pleas, see TASK FORCE REPORT 10- II.
15 Bongiovanni, supra note 14.
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always is how much leniency an offender will be given in return
for a plea of guilty. 16 That issue forms the substantive matter of
the plea bargaining process in all jurisdictions, although the fac-
tors which determine the result and the way in which it is reached
are often tremendously different among the different jurisdic-
tions.1 7 Since the practice of plea bargaining is intertwined with
the phenomenon of prosecutor's discretion, the variation of sys-
tems is to a great extent the result of variations in the policies and
operating procedures of prosecutors' offices. If a particular prose-
cutor's office is quite selective and realistic in choosing whom to
prosecute and what charges to bring, then there is less likelihood
that either defense or prosecution will feel compelled to initiate
bargaining. On the other hand, in jurisdictions where bargaining is
the general rule, there is usually a corresponding, well-established
practice of initial over-charging by prosecutors.18 In addition, an
agreement is often made in order to avoid statutory minimum or
mandatory sentences which may be present within the jurisdic-
tion.19
Another major point of difference-the extent of judicial parti-
cipation in the process-may serve to illustrate these variations.
In some jurisdictions such as the criminal courts of Philadelphia a
judge will play a major role in the plea bargaining process.
20
There, the two counsel go before a calendar judge the day before
trial. The calendar judge often invites counsel to confer with each
other and discuss the possibility of a plea with them. They report
to him on the status of their negotiations, and he will indicate
16 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME 134.
17 D. NEWMAN, supra note 4, at xiii, 79. Variations exist, for example, as to the power
of the prosecutor to make bargains and as to the judge's participation in the negotiations,
Mclntrye & Lippman, supra note 5, at 1157. "In form, a plea bargain can be anything
from a series of careful conferences to a hurried consultation in a courthouse corridor. In
content it can be anything from a conscientious exploration of the facts and dispositional
alternatives available and appropriate to a defendant, to a perfunctory deal .. " PRESI-
DENT'S COMMISSION, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME 11.
18 H. SUBIN, supra note 4, at 34-36. This over-charging may consist of an initial felony
charge which is later reduced to a misdemeanor, or an initial charge of several mis-
demeanors in order to obtain a guilty plea on one misdemeanor. See Coon, The Indictment
Process and Reduced Charges, 40 N.Y.S. BAR J. 434 (1968), for a discussion of prose-
cutors' practices of filing extra chages in anticipation of later bargaining, and a possible
subversion of the grand jury process because of it.
19 D. NEWMAN, supra note 4, at 76; Enker, supra note 8, at 109. For example, in those
jurisdictions where possession of marijuana is a felony carrying a mandatory minimum
sentence, the recent practice is to engage almost always in plea negotiation. (Author's
experience in criminal defense work in Cleveland, Ohio).
20The description of the system in Philadelphia is found in Bongiovanni, supra note 14,
at 547; Recent Decisions, Criminal Procedure-Plea Bargaining, 8 DUQUESNE L. REV.
461, 468 (1970). Note that this judicial participation is contra to standard 3.3 in A.B.A.
STANDARDS, supra note 7, at 11-12. According to Thomas, An Exploration of Plea
Bargaining, 1969 CRIM. L. REV. 69, 74, the judge plays a much more active role in
bargaining in the United States than in England.
[VOL. 4:3
Plea Bargaining
what he thinks is an appropriate disposition and sentence. If both
counsel and the defendant agree, then the calendar judge hears the
case; but if not, then the case is assigned to another judge for trial.
Similarly, in Chicago, a conference with the judge and prosecutor
is available on request; and in Brooklyn, cases are mandatorily
referred to a "Conference and Discussion Court" before docket-
ing.21 On the other hand, there are many courts in which no
judicial participation occurs in the bargaining process. In the
District of Columbia Court of General Sessions, serious criminal
cases are bargained in an almost formal plea-bargaining session
which operates as an informal prosecutor's hearing in the prose-
cutor's office. 22  Other jurisdictions also avoid judicial in-
volvement: in Los Angeles County there is little judicial participa-
tion in bargaining;' in Harris County (Houston) there is heavy
emphasis on plea negotiations between prosecution and defense;
and in Detroit, negotiations are mandatory and include a pre-trial
conference without judicial participation.
23
A variety of factors may be considered and discussed between
the prosecutor and defense attorney (and sometimes judge) within
the frameworks for plea bargaining mentioned above. Such factors
include the nature and evidence of the crime alleged to have been
committed; various theories, and the strengths or weaknesses of
both sides; 24 and the recommended sentence based on the defend-
ant's background (previous record, past employment, military ser-
vice and education). 25 Aside from these factors, the tactics and
strategy involved in the informal bargaining process are also sig-
nificant considerations in determining what concessions are avail-
21 McIntyre & Lippman, supra note 5, at 1156-57.
"In Brooklyn and Chicago the courts participate in and sometimes preside
over the negotiation process, normally after the indictment is returned. Trial
judges in Chicago will listen to a summary of the facts of the case and
indicate to the defendant's counsel the kind of sentence that would be
imposed on a plea in order to give him a precise and realistic basis for
advising his client. In Brooklyn the negotiation process is centered in a
special court entitled the 'Conference and Discussion Court', whose sole
purpose is summarily to review both sides of felony cases at the time of
arraignment and to recommend reductions, concessions and settlements
where indicated." Id. at 1157.
22 H. SUBIN, supra note 4, at 42-48. This hearing is an integral part of the process in the
General Sessions Court. The defense argues its case, and the prosecutor decides on one of
the following: no deal, a felony reduced to a misdemeanor, some charges dropped in
exchange for a plea, or a case dismissed by a nolle prosequi. There is no sifting of the facts
in the Courtroom. Id. Note that these hearings may serve as informal discovery devices for
both sides. Id. at 46.
23 McIntyre & Lippman, supra note 5, at 1156. For a description of the system in
Detroit, see generally Cahalan, Efficiency and Justice, 5 THE PROSECUTOR 330 (1969).
24 Notes and Comments, Criminal Law: Plea Agreements in Oklahoma, 22 OKLA. L.
REV. 81, 83-85 (1969).
25 Bongiovanni, supra note 14, at 546- 48. For a general description of the way bargain-
ing discussions operate today see TASK FORCE REPORT 9- 11.
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able to defendants.26 Because of the high volume of cases, any
strategies which might cause a burden on the court's or prose-
cutor's time would naturally be an effective bargaining tool for the
defense attorney. Since the court and prosecutor know that they
must dispose of a certain number of cases, time is critical to them.
If any particular case is consuming too much time, then they may
be forced to offer a greater leniency to the defendant in order to
eliminate the case and make room for others. Although defense
attorneys are encouraged to make sure that the defendant gets a
fair deal, 27 they may tend to overlook this responsibility if they
can earn a quick fee by persuading a defendant to cop-out on a
plea. Likewise, the prosecutor's strategy may be to overstate his
case against the defendant and thereby bluff him into a guilty plea.
Regardless of the nature of the process, once an agreement is
reached, counsel recommends it to the defendant while the prose-
cutor recommends it to the court. At this point the defendant
must weigh the risks of conviction on the charge as it stands
against the certainty of a reduced penalty for a plea of guilty to a
lesser charge. More often than not he will yield to the intense
pressures brought to bear on him by the prosecutor and frequently
an appointed counsel, and will agree to enter a plea of guilty in
court.
B. Constitutionality of the Negotiated Plea
The courts have been hesitant to consider squarely the con-
stitutional objections to plea bargaining-that it chills fifth and
sixth amendment rights-and have successfully avoided direct
discussions or analysis of the question. 28 One logical reason for
this judicial reluctance may be the judges' awareness of the heavy
caseload and knowledge that if plea bargaining were declared
unconstitutional, it would have catastrophic results for the oper-
ation of the courts. Another reason may be their understanding of
the difficulty involved in court enforcement of a constitutional rule
against plea bargaining. 29 Many appellate courts have implicitly
26AIschuler, supra note 13, at 56-57. See generally Polstein, supra note 9, as to
strategy for defense counsel in negotiating a criminal case. His outline of defense counsel's
job includes the following: (1) obtain offer of an acceptable plea from prosecutor; (2) find a
judge who will accept the plea; (3) persuade defendant to accept the plea offered; and (4)
make sure the pre-sentence report has all complete and necessary information for sentenc-
ing.
.27 Polstein, supra note 9.
28 See generally Note, The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HARV. L. REV.
1387, 1395- 1407 (1970), which discusses this judicial reluctance to approve explicitly the
constitutionality of plea bargaining, and concludes that plea bargaining should be declared
unconstitutional.
29 Id. at 1407- 10.
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approved the bargaining system by enforcing pleas made pursuant
to bargaining and by stating that plea bargaining is not against
public policy.30 The courts have hidden behind the voluntary and
knowing tests for taking guilty pleas, implying that if these tests
are met then pleas based upon bargains are acceptable3 1 Occa-
sionally a court may express the constitutional issue in terms of a
defendant not being denied his due process of law as the result of
his guilty plea pursuant to a bargain.3 2 Nevertheless, this prior,
passive judicial acquiescence in the system not necessarily a
judicial determination of constitutionality.
In United States v. Jackson,33 the United States Supreme
Court considered a case involving what might be called statutory
plea bargaining.3 4 This kind of bargaining occurs where the statute
defining the crime includes inducement for the defendant to plead
guilty rather than exercise his right to a trial. The Federal Kidnap-
ping Act provides that interstate kidnappers shall be punished by
death if the kidnapped person has not been liberated unharmed,
and if the jury's verdict shall so recommend. However, there is no
procedure for giving the death penalty to a defendant who pleads
guilty. Since the statute makes the risk of death the price for
asserting the right to trial by jury, the Court held that portion of
the statute imposing the death penalty unconstitutional because it
impaired the free exercise of that constitutional right.3 5 It is essen-
tial to note that the Court did not attack the bargaining process,
nor in fact consider that question. Instead, the statute was struck
down for inducing the defendant to waive jury trial.
The statutory inducement to plead guilty which was involved in
Jackson can be distinguished from prosecutorial plea bargaining,
which also has the effect of inducing waiver of jury trial. In
prosecutorial plea bargaining, the defendant can weigh the risks of
going to trial, being convicted, and receiving the maximum sen-
tence against the kinds of leniency which the prosecutor is
offering him for a guilty plea. If the leniency being offered is
insufficient from the defendant's point of view, then he can go to
30 State v. Johnson, 279 Minn. 209, 214, 156 N.W.2d 218, 222 (1968). The court said,
"Plea bargaining between competent counsel and with the intelligent acquiescence of the
defendant, it may be observed at the outset, is not in conflict with public policy." See also
Brown v. Beto, 377 F.2d 950, 956 (5th Cir. 1967); Brewer v. People, 452 P.2d 370 (Sup.
Ct. Colo. 1969); State v. Byrd, 203 Kan. 45, 50, 453 P.2d 22, 27 (1969).
31 Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101 (5th Cir.), rev'd on rehearing, 246 F.2d 571
(5th Cir. 1957) (en banc), rev'd 356 U.S. 26 (1958) (per curiam on confession of error).
32 State v. Johnson, 279 Minn. 209, 156 N.W.2d 218 (1968).
- 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
34 See Comment, Constitutional Law - Plea Bargaining - New Jersey Statute Allowing a
Defendant to Avoid the Death Penalty by Pleading Non Vult or Nolo Contendere held
Valid, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 612, 619-22 (1969).
-3 390 U.S. at 57 I.
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trial facing the same maximum sentence with which he was con-
fronted when the bargaining began. The chilling effect on the
defendant's right to trial by jury is at least of a different dimension
from the situation in Jackson, where, under a statute, to demand a
jury trial may cost the defendant his life. The defendant in Jack-
son was not confronted so much with incentives to plead guilty
(as in prosecutorial plea bargaining), but rather with a major
disincentive to exercise his right to jury trial. Where one of the
choices is death, surely the choice is much less voluntary.
3 6
The holding in Jackson has not precluded the United States
Supreme Court in several recent cases from implying that plea
bargaining is a constitutionally permissible procedure. In Brady v.
United States37 the United States Supreme Court held that a
guilty plea in a Lindbergh Law 38 prosecution was not inherently
involuntary. The Court phrased petitioner's claim in terms "that it
violates the Fifth Amendment to influence or encourage a guilty
plea by opportunity or promise of leniency and that a guilty plea is
coerced and invalid if influenced by the fear of a possibly higher
penalty for the crime charged if a conviction is obtained after the
State is put to its proof."39 After comparing Brady's case to
others in which leniencies may be available to the defendant for a
guilty plea, the Court characterized these situations as those
where the "defendant might never plead guilty absent the possi-
bility or certainty that the plea will result in a lesser penalty than
the sentence that could be imposed after a trial and a verdict of
guilty." 40 Significantly, it concluded:
We decline to hold, however, that a guilty plea is compelled
and invalid under the Fifth Amendment whenever motivated
by the defendant's desire to accept the certainty or probabil-
ity of a lesser penalty rather than face a wider range of
possibilities extending from acquittal to conviction and a
higher penalty authorized by law for the crime charged.
41
36 Another consideration in Jackson may have been the seriousness of the statute which
carries a death penalty with it, as a possible penalty for asserting one's constitutional
rights. See generally the opinion of J. Brennan in Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790,
809- 10 (1970).
37 397 U.S. 742 (1970). In Brady the defendant pleaded guilty and was sentenced before
the intervening decision in Jackson was handed down. Jackson was decided while Brady's
request for post-conviction relief was before the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit,
404 F.2d 601 (1968), and then before its disposition in the United States Supreme Court.
38 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1964).
39 397 U.S. at 750- 51.
40 Id. at 75 I. The Court specifically excluded situations in which the prosecutor threat-
ens prosecution on a charge not justified by the evidence, or in which the trial judge
threatens defendant with a harsher sentence if convicted after trial in order to induce him
to plead guilty. Id. at 751 n. 8.
41 Id. at 751.
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This conclusion would seem to constitute a judicial declaration of
the constitutionality of plea bargaining, although it was stated in
dicta. The Court in Brady also considered the prevalence of guilty
pleas and, in what seems to be a defense of the system, discussed
the advantages of plea bargaining both to the defendant and to the
prosecution. 42 The only qualification suggested by the Court was
that a different view may be taken if innocent defendants were
encouraged to plead guilty; but this would not be considered a
problem so long as the voluntary and intelligent requirements for
plea-taking are strictly followed.
43
The same reasoning applied in Brady was followed by the
Court in Parker v. North Carolina, 44 which held that a defend-
ant's guilty plea that was possibly motivated by a desire to avoid
the death penalty is not inherently involuntary. The North Caro-
lina statute provided a maximum penalty in the event of a plea of
guilty lower than the penalty authorized after a verdict of guilty
by a jury. The Court recognized that under Jackson, imposition of
the death penalty in accord with the North Carolina statutory
scheme might be unconstitutional; however, it could not find any
way to distinguish the facts in Parker from Brady on the issue of
the voluntariness of the plea in view of the statute.45
North Carolina v. Alford,46 the most recent United States
Supreme Court pronouncement in the area of plea bargaining,
seems to reinforce the language of Brady and establish more
securely the constitutionality of the procedure. The first part of
the Court's holding states that a guilty plea which represented a
voluntary and intelligent choice among alternatives available to
the defendant, especially where he was represented by competent
counsel, was not compelled within the meaning of the fifth amend-
ment merely because the plea was entered to avoid the possibility
of a death penalty. 47 The Court also held that, because of the
substantial evidence indicating actual guilt in this case, the lower
court committed no constitutional error in accepting a voluntary
and intelligent guilty plea despite the defendant's claim of in-
nocence. 48 In essence, then, the Court is ruling that: "[a]n in-
dividual accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and under-
standingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if
he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts
42 Id. at 752-53.
43 Id. at 758.
-397 U.S. 790 (1970).
45 Id. at 795.
46400 U.S. 25 (1970).
47 Id. at 3 1.
48 Id. at 38.
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constituting the crime." 49 While such action is constitutionally
permissible, the Court qualified its ruling by stating that greater
restrictions may be imposed by the states on acceptance of guilty
pleas from defendants who assert their innocence.
50
In dicta the Court in Alford commented on bargaining for lesser
included offenses:
The States in their wisdom may take this course by Statute or
otherwise and may prohibit the practice of accepting pleas to
lesser included offenses under any circumstances. But this is
not the mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill
of Rights. The prohibition against involuntary or unintelligent
pleas should not be relaxed, but neither should an exercise in
arid logic render those constitutional guarantees count-
er-productive and put in jeopardy the very human values they
were meant to preserve. 5 [Emphasis added].
This language may be interpreted as establishing or reinforcing
three propositions. First, plea bargaining-at least bargaining for
lesser included offenses-is acceptable under the Federal Con-
stitution. Second, the Federal Constitution does not forbid the
states, in their administration of criminal justice, from restricting
the availability of plea bargaining. Finally, the Court reaffirms its
requirements that a plea be taken voluntarily and intelligently.
Thus, the trend emerging in recent United States Supreme Court
cases seems to indicate the constitutionality of the plea bargaining
system, under most, if not all, circumstances.
C. Voluntary and Understanding Requirement
All guilty pleas received in court, whether or not the result of
bargaining, are subject to certain constitutional requirements.
The primary rule is that a guilty plea, entered in either a state or
federal court, must be both voluntarily and knowingly made.
52
49Id. at 37. Compare with McCoy v. United States, 124 U.S. App. D.C. 177, 363 F.2d
306 (D.C. Cir. 1966), holding that the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
accept a plea, in view of the voluntary nature of the plea and defendant's understanding of
the nature of the charge, despite the fact that the defendant in discussion with the court
affirmatively stated that he was not guilty.
50400 U.S. at 38 n.! 1.
5 1 Id. at 39.
52 Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962); Kercheval v. United States, 274
U.S. 220 (1927); Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942); United States ex rel. Rivera v.
Follette, 395 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1968). The terms "understandingly" and "intelligently" are
often substituted by the courts for "knowingly," and any one of the terms represents the
same set of requirements to be used along with the test of voluntariness. Thus two
separate requirements are involved: a plea must be voluntarily entered (without coercion);
and it must also be understandingly entered (defendant must understand the nature of the
charge, the law relating to his case, and the consequences of conviction). For a general
summary of the constitutional requirements for the taking of a guilty plea, see Gentile,
Fair Bargains and Accurate Pleas, 49 B.U.L. REV. 514-23 (1969). See also, Enker, supra
note 8, at 116- 17 for a discussion of a voluntary standard for pleas.
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This constitutional requirement has been incorporated into the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure53 and applied to the states in
Boykin v. Alabama.54 The Supreme Court has held that a "de-
fendant is entitled to plead anew if a United States district court
accepts his guilty plea without fully adhering to the procedure
provided for in Rule 1 1.''55 In the recent case of Boykin, 56 the
Court went further in its requirements by holding that for a valid
conviction the record must disclose that the defendant voluntarily
and understandingly entered his plea of guilty. The Court rea-
soned that since a plea of guilty is a conviction and thus
effectively waives all of defendant's federal constitutional rights,
57
such a waiver must be proper and affirmatively stated in the
record. 58 Thus, a guilty plea entered pursuant to a plea agreement
has been held to be involuntary and therefore invalid where the
defendant did not fully understand the plea agreement, 59 where
the defendant was too young and uneducated to enter properly a
plea without counsel,60 and where the plea was induced by a
consideration which was illegal under both state and federal law.6 1
In United States ex rel. Thurmond v. Mancusi,6 2 involving a
collateral attack on a guilty plea, the court held the plea in-
voluntary and void where the defendant believed at the time he
pleaded guilty that a coercive promise or threat had been made by
either the court or prosecutor. In fact neither had been made;
however, since defendant's plea was induced by this belief, the
plea was held to be involuntary. 63
5 3 .FED. R. CRIM. P. 1I.
.4 395 U.S. 238 (1969). The Court's decision applied the requirements of FED. R. CRIM.
P. I I to the states as a matter of federal constitutional law. See generally Note, Criminal
Procedure-Requirements for Acceptance of Guilty Pleas, 48 N.C.L. REv. 352 (1970),
which discusses the voluntary and knowing requirements under the FED. R. CRIM. P. and
Boykin, as well as guilty plea acceptance safeguards.
55 McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 463-64 (1969). This decision was based
solely upon the Court's construction of Rule 11 and was made pursuant to its supervisory
power over the lower federal courts.
56 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
57 Right against self-incrimination; right to jury trial; and right to confront one's accu-
sers.
58 395 U.S. at 242.
59 United States ex rel. McCant v. Brierly, 304 F. Supp. 651 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
60 Lesley v. Oklahoma, 407 F.2d 543 (10th Cir. 1969).
61 Lassiter v. Turner, 423 F.2d 897 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970). But cf.
the following cases in which the courts have held that a plea is not involuntary or coerced
just because a bargain was involved: Rogers v. Wainwright, 394 F.2d 492 (5th Cir. 1968);
Ford v. United States, 295 F. Supp. 1180 (D.C. Mo. 1969); Hansen v. Mathews, 296 F.
Supp. 1328 (D.C. Wis. 1969); State v. Olbeksen 7 Ariz. App. 474, 441 P.2d 71 (1968); or
not unknowingly entered because a bargain was involved, Commissioner ex rel. Kerekes v.
Maronez, 432 Pa. 337, 223 A.2d 699 (1966).
62 275 F. Supp. 508 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
63 275 F. Supp. at 514- 15. The court discussed the voluntary requirement in the context
of a subjective test, inquiring into the state of the defendant's mind (what he believed)
under the circumstances. A similar view is expressed in Comments and Notes, The Guilty
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Although the courts have in several cases overturned the sen-
tence derived from a plea bargain because the defendant had not
voluntarily and knowingly accepted the bargain, in most cases the
existence of bargaining and agreement is never brought out in
open court. The usual practice is to conduct the on-the-record
guilty plea proceedings as if there had been no negotiations or
agreements. 64 In the course of this procedure the defendant
denies that any promises have been made to him, even though he
has been promised concessions and has been told that the prose-
cutor will not grant such concessions unless he pleads guilty. 65 To
label such a procedure a "fairy tale script," as one commentator
has, 66 is being entirely too kind, for it is nothing less than per-
jury.67 Moreover, the effect of wide-spread non-recognition of
plea bargaining by courts in the plea-taking proceedings has con-
tributed to its low visibility, making the system susceptible to
several abuses.
68
D. Abuses in the Present System
It is widely recognized that severe abuses often occur in the
Plea in South Dakota, 15 S. DAKOTA L. REV. 66, 71 (1970). A test of voluntariness was
enunciated by Judge Tuttle in Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101, 115 (5th Cir.)
(dissenting opinion), rev'don rehearing, 246 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1957) (en banc) (opinion of
Tuttle, J.), rev'd per curiam on confession of error, 356 U.S. 26 (1958): "[A] plea of guilty
entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any
commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless
induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation
(including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises) or perhaps by promises that are by their
nature improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor's business (e.g.
bribes)." This test was adopted by the majority when the case was reversed on rehearing,
246 F.2d 571, and by the Supreme Court in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970),
as the standard for voluntariness of guilty pleas. In Cortez v. United States, 337 F.2d 699
(9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied 381 U.S. 953 (1965) the court stated: "The important thing is
not that there shall be no 'deal' or 'bargain', but that the plea shall be a genuine one, by a
defendant who is guilty; one who understands his situation, his rights, and the con-
sequences of the plea, and is neither deceived nor coerced." 337 F.2d at 705.
6People v. Byrd, 12 Mich. App. 186, 211-12, 162 N.W.2d 777, 790-91 (1968). See
United States v. Rizzo, 362 F.2d 97, 98 (7th Cir. 1966), in which the judge, who is aware
that plea negotiations have occurred, asks the defendant the same questions normally
asked to satisfy FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. See also the requirements for accepting a plea of
guilty set out in People v. Taylor, 9 Mich. App. 333, 155 N.W.2d 723 (1968), rev'd on
other grounds 383 Mich. 338, 175 N.W.2d 715 (1970).
12 Mich. App. at 211- 12, 162 N.W.2d at 790.
66 Bongiovanni, supra note 14, at 548.
67 The court in Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 274-75 (D.C. Cir. 1969), com-
mented that there is "no justification for a courtroom charade in which the judge asks
whether a plea has been induced by any promises, and the defendant replies that it has not,
when all actors realize that quite the contrary is true."
68 According to D. NEWMAN, supra note 4, at 31: "Judges ask the question [whether
any promises have been made to the defendant] as a matter of routine and almost
invariably receive the monosyllabic negative reply. The only way an improper or un-
honored plea inducement comes to the attention of the court is if the defendant complains
at the time of sentencing or appeals his conviction because the bargain was not kept."
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process of plea bargaining. 69 In fact, occasionally a court will
admit that at least the potential for abuse is inherent in every
plea agreement. 70 The most frequently mentioned and potentially
dangerous problem is an innocent person being induced to plead
guilty.7 1 Innocent persons may be induced to plead guilty because
of fear of damaging publicity surrounding a repugnant charge,
72
or fear of a harsher sentence if convicted after trial.73 Although
one might initially question the proposition that an innocent per-
son would under any circumstances voluntarily subject himself to
conviction and punishment, oftentimes the greatest pressures to
plead guilty may be brought to bear on defendants who are possi-
bly innocent. 74 In these cases the prosecutor seeks a bargain to
save a weak or difficult case, and the offer of leniency is likely to
be excessive. 75 The result is that a defendant must decide be-
tween his chances of acquittal at trial, regardless of guilt, and an
ensured, comparatively light sentence. According to one com-
mentator who studied the prosecutor's role in bargaining: "When
prosecutors respond to a likelihood of acquittal by magnifying the
pressures to plead guilty, they seem to exhibit a remarkable dis-
regard for the danger of false conviction." 76 Although there is no
way of knowing how many innocent persons have been forced to
plead guilty and perhaps pay a fine or serve a prison sentence
because of plea bargaining, the structure of the present system
creates a high potential for this kind of risk which may involve
many defendants.
At the other end of the spectrum is the risk that habitual
criminals and dangerous offenders may be able to manipulate the
system to obtain excessively lenient treatment. 77 In the prose-
89 TASK FORCE REPORT 1I- 12; Folberg, supra note 13 at 205.
70 "When considering any case where 'plea bargaining' has been shown to occur, the
Court is cognizant that abuses may result... " State v. Popejoy, 9 Ariz. App. 170, 450
P.2d 411, 412 (1969).
71 D. NEWMAN, supra note 4, at 38-39; Alschuler, supra note 13, at 64; The Influence
of the Defendant's Plea on Judicial Determination of Sentence, supra note 12, at 220-2 1.
72
TASK FORCE REPORT I 1- 12.
73 
Id.
74Alschuler, supra note 13, at 60. See also Rossett, The Negotiated Guilty Plea, 374
ANNALS 70, 71-73 (1967), describing the tactical pressures involved in the bargaining,
process between defense lawyer and prosecutor. 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 822, at 246
(3d ed. 1940):
under certain stresses a person, especially one of defective mentality or
peculiar temperament, may falsely acknowledge guilt. This possibility arises
wherever the innocent person is placed in such a situation that the untrue
acknowledgment of guilt is at the time the more promising of two alternatives
between which he is obliged to choose; that is, he chooses any risk that may
be in falsely acknowledging guilt, in preference to some worse alternative
associated with silence.
75 Gentile, supra note 52, at 550.
76 Alschuler, supra note 13, at 62.
77 TASK FORCE REPORT I1-12."
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cutor's quest to obtain guilty pleas, he may, when confronted with
difficult cases, simply find it advantageous to offer excessive re-
wards to some defendants. 78 To the extent that bargaining is
concluded without an objective evaluation of the treatment and
correctional needs of the defendant, the sentence which he receiv-
es for committing a crime is unrelated to what is required for his
rehabilitation or what may be necessary to protect society.
Another area of abuse in plea bargaining results from the low
visibility of the process. 79 If threats are made by the prosecutor,
since they are not recorded there is a difficult problem of proof.
Often the defendant, defense attorney, and prosecutor will state in
open court that no bargain or promises have been made, when in
fact they know that the plea was arranged.80 If the court deter-
mines that the plea was voluntarily and knowingly given, then the
matter of a bargain is substantially hidden from any judicial scrut-
iny. Since there is generally no record of what transpires at the
bargaining session, the court is unable to judge the validity or
fairness of the agreement.8 ' The lack of a record of the agreement
also makes it difficult if not impossible for the defendant, on
appeal or in a post-conviction proceeding, to show any irregularity
or coercion which would make his plea involuntary or otherwise
invalid.8 2 After having denied the existence of a bargain in court,
the defendant who quietly accepts the judgment and sentence of
the court cannot credibly assert on appeal that an agreement to
which he was a party was not kept. Furthermore, an appellate
court would have no criteria on which to decide whether a bargain
had been properly performed, since there is no written record of
the terms of the agreement. Only the potentially conflicting oral
testimony under oath of defendant, defense attorney and prose-
cutor would be available to establish the precise terms of the
agreement. Even with a record of the plea-taking proceedings, as
required by Boykin, the court cannot know what transpired be-
tween the defendant and the prosecutor outside the courtroom.83
78 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME 135.
79 TASK FORCE REPORT 9; J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT
IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 13 (1966). "Plea bargaining may be a useful procedure, espe-
cially in congested urban jurisdictions, but neither the dignity of the law, nor the quality of
justice, nor the protection of society from dangerous criminals is enhanced by its being
conducted covertly." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME I1.80 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME 1I.
81 Plea Bargaining-Justice Off The Record, supra note 4, at 435.
82 Id. See State v. Jennings, 104 Ariz. 3, 448 P.2d 59 (1968), modified on rehearing, 104
Ariz. 159, 449 P.2d 938 (1968), in which defendant, who had originally denied the
existence of a bargain, failed to persuade the court that the prosecutor had coerced him
into changing his plea from not guilty to guilty for dismissal of other charges.




A third major problem with plea bargaining as it operates today
is that jurisdictional differences may result in inequalities in the
opportunity to bargain, and many defendants may receive unequal
justice.8 4 A defendant who happens to be in a jurisdiction where
there is a very heavy case load and a prosecutor's office which
makes a high number of bargains, may get a much better deal than
if he were charged in a rural area with a light case load. Even
within the same jurisdiction, some judges are known to be more
inclined to make liberal deals with defendants, and thus the prac-
tice of "judge-shopping" '  creates inequalities in treatment.8 6 One
might make an equal protection argument that defendants charged
with the same crime in the same jurisdiction should have an equal
opportunity to plea bargain with the prosecutor. However, unless
a purposeful scheme of discrimination on the part of a prose-
cutor's office can be proved, it is unlikely that such an argument
could prevail.8 7 A stronger argument for equal opportunity to plea
bargain could be made where several co-defendants in the same
jurisdiction are not all allowed to bargain with the prosecutor.8
Yet, in view of the close relationship between bargaining and the
prosecutor's discretion, the courts will undoubtedly be somewhat
reluctant to interfere.
The widespread prosecutor's practice of over-charging to in-
duce the defendants to plead guilty to a lesser offense presents
another problem created by plea bargaining.89 Prior to any plea
negotiations, a prosecutor may strengthen his bargaining position
by charging the defendant with the most serious crime that an
84 Pleas of Guilty, Symposium, supra note 5, at 754; D. NEWMAN, supra note 4, at
42-44. The sense of injustice among defendants is one of the abuses discussed in TASK
FORCE REPORT 1 1.
5 TASK FORCE REPORT 1I.
86 D. NEWMAN, supra note 4, at 42-44. See also Devitt, How Can We Effectively
Minimize Unjustified Disparity in Federal Criminal Sentences?, 41 F.R.D. 249 (1966).
8 7 See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962) and People v. Gray, 254 Cal. App. 2d 256,
63 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1967) in which the courts rejected equal protection arguments regarding
selective enforcement of laws by prosecutors.
s In Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967), the court of appeals
held that for the U.S. Attorney to consent to a guilty plea tendered by a co-defendant for
the lesser included offense under the indictment, while refusing to grant the same plea for
the other defendant, did not constitute a denial of defendant's constitutional rights. The
court decided the case on the basis of prosecutor's discretion under the executive branch,
and avoided the main issue of equal opportunity to bargain. The related issue of disparity
of sentences between two co-defendants, one pleading guilty and one going to trial, was
litigated in United States v. Wiley, 267 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1959), sentence set aside on
remand, 278 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1960). The court held that where defendant's defense was
not frivolous and was not presented in bad faith, the fact that he asked for trial could not
justify the imposition of a harsher sentence upon him than upon other defendants who had
pleaded guilty.
89 See H. SUBIN, supra note 4, at 47-48
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expansive reading of the evidence will permit. This practice in-
variably involves a certain amount of harassment.
III. REFORMING THE SYSTEM IN VIEW OF APPROPRIATE GOALS
TO BE SERVED
A. Goals
The abuses and irregularities which occur in plea bargaining
could be minimized by explicitly defining and formalizing the
procedure of negotiation. The primary consideration in any situ-
ation involving plea bargaining is the constitutional requirement
that any guilty plea be voluntarily and knowingly made.90 An
initial safeguard would be the availability of counsel during the
process of negotiation. In addition, the following four goals would
seem to be critical elements in any system of plea negotiation; and
may serve as criteria by which to judge the success of any new
procedures.
First, guilty pleas based upon plea agreements should accurate-
ly reflect the approximate degree of the defendant's guilt and his
personal and background characteristics. Thus, plea bargaining
which induces an innocent person to plead guilty should not be
sanctioned. 91 Conversely, when there is substantial evidence in-
dicating guilt of a certain offense, any reduction of the charge
should be carefully scrutinized. One way to avoid ficticious pleas
is to encourage the close, objective scrutiny of plea discussions
and agreements. Accuracy of pleas would also be improved if the
terms of plea agreements were carefully defined, stated in writing,
and available for judicial evaluation.
Second, the criminal justice system should not only dispense
justice but should provide the appearance of justice. Plea bargain-
ing as part of this system presently falls short in both regards.
Accounts of the practice in the media tend to emphasize its
negative aspects.92 As a result an essential element in the proper
functioning of the system of criminal justice-the public con-
9oSee text accompanying notes 52-68 supra.
91 This proposition should be distingushed from the situation in North Carolina v.
Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). Although the defendant in that case was asserting his
innocence when he agreed to plead guilty to a lesser charge, there was strong factual
evidence of his actual guilt which could support the guilty plea. The kinds of cases which
are dangerous are those where an innocent defendant decides to plead guilty for leniency,
he does not assert his innocence, and he is convicted even if there is great doubt as to the
evidence surrounding his guilt.
92 One widely circulated newspaper article describes plea bargaining as "a universal
courtroom practice that is paradoxically regarded as both indispensable and undesirable by
judges, prosecutors and even some defendants." Whitney, supra note 5, at col. I. The
same article emphasizes the light sentences handed out, a weakening of the deterrent effect
of the laws, the low visibility of the system, and the hypocrisy of a defendant denying that
any promises had been made to him. Id. at cols. 1, 2.
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fidence-is diminished. 93 This goal of legitimizing plea negotia-
tions in the public conscience at the very least requires an in-
crease in the visibility of the bargaining process. 94 Courts should
openly recognize that plea negotiation is a fundamental fact of the
criminal process, and should scrutinize the bargaining process
whenever it produces a negotiated plea. 95 All of the bargaining
procedures should be conducted in a visible, recorded procedure.
In addition, the procedure should be sufficiently formalized so
that some uniformity prevails in the treatment of various defend-
ants. In this regard, there should be an equality of opportunity for
defendants to negotiate a plea,96 and a uniformity in resulting
sentences for defendants who are of similar backgrounds.
Another goal in improving the plea bargaining process should
be the proper correctional disposition of the defendant. Plea bar-
gaining is a method of case disposition in which conviction is
contingent upon the prior selection of a particular sentence or
selected range of punishments. The bargain therefore dictates the
peno-correctional decision of the criminal system. Under the
present system the bargains are not responsive to the defendant's
proper correctional needs; for they often provide punishment
which is either too harsh or too lenient for the defendant under the
circumstances. 97 When sentence concessions are the substance of
an agreement the procedure should utilize the same preparation
and considerations of a pre-sentence report which occur after
conviction at trial.
A final consideration is the efficient administration of criminal
justice. Any improved system of plea discussions and plea agree-
ments must be responsive to the problem of already congested
court dockets. The costs of the proceedings in terms of human
resources and money must be weighed against the number of
cases which may be processed.
B. A Model Court Rule for Plea Discussions and Agreements98
DEFINITIONS:
1.1 For the purposes of this Rule the following definitions are
applicable unless otherwise indicated:
93 D. OAKS & W. LEHMAN, A CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE INDIGENT 168-74
(1968).
94 See TASK FORCE REPORT 12; H. SUBIN, supra note 4, at 139.
95 Plea Bargaining-Justice Off the Record, supra note 4, at 436; Thomas, supra note
20, at 7 1.
96 The equal opportunity to bargain is discussed in The Unconstitutionality of Plea
Bargaining, supra note 28, at 1394-95.
97 See text accompanying notes 77-79 supra.
98 This rule is offered merely as one suggested procedure for improving the present plea
bargaining practices, especially those in state courts. As a model rule there might be any
SPRING 197 11
Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 4:3
(a) Criminal Cases-Criminal cases refers to all felony charges
and all misdemeanor charges, with the exception of minor or petty
traffic offenses.
(b) Participants-The participants are the prosecutor, defend-
ant, and defense counsel. In any action involving the participants,
if there is no defense counsel required by law or if the defendant
knowingly and voluntarily waives his right to counsel, then he
may proceed alone. Under no circumstances may the defense
attorney bind the defendant to any agreement against his will.
(c) Defense -Defense refers to either the defendant or defense
counsel where both are present, or just to the defendant if there is
no defense council required by law or if the defendant knowingly
and voluntarily waives his right to counsel. Under no circum-
stances may the defense attorney bind the defendant to any agree-
ment against his will.
MANDATORY PRE-TRIAL HEARING:
2.1. As soon as possible after an information or indictment is
handed down in every criminal case, but not earlier than when all
participants are prepared, a pre-trial hearing is to be held, under
the direction of a master (or judge)99 appointed by the court, and
number of variations which would prove to be quite acceptable in practice. The form of a
court rule, to be adopted by the supreme court in a state for all courts within the
jurisdiction, was chosen rather than a legislative enactment for several reasons: A rule
would be easier to initiate than the passage of a piece of legislation in a state legislature;
and it would be flexible and easily adaptable to the reactions of participants and judges.
Authority to promulgate such a rule in the federal system is found in the United States
Supreme Court's power to make criminal rules for the federal courts pursuant to the
enabling act of 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1964), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1968). In the states,
authority may be found in appropriate state constitutional provisions or enabling acts. In
Michigan, e.g., the supreme court has rule-making power pursuant to an enabling act,
MIcH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.223 (1968). There is no doubt that plea discussions are
properly a matter of practice and procedure under such statutes. See MICH. GEN. CT. R.
I1 and Author's Comments in MICH. CT. R. ANN. (West, 1962). Regarding the
rule-making power of the courts see generally 8 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1.02 (2d
ed. 1970).
99 For the purposes of this Court Rule an alternative system substituting judges for
masters would be equally feasible if judges were used in some type of rotating-docket
system, so that the judge presiding at the hearing would not be the same judge who
presides at trial. One might contend that a judge, with more trial experience than a master,
would be better able to predict how a case might result at trial, and thus the judge would
suggest a more realistic agreement. However, the relevance of this factor is diminished by
the fact that the principal goal of the Model Court Rule is to bring case dispositions by
plea agreement into line with the defendant's correctional needs, rather than mere pre-
dictions of the possibilities at trial. Another reason for preferring judicial supervision over
plea negotiations and agreements may be that judges should possess sole discretion
regarding sentences and that the Model Court Rule would in some instances give this
authority to masters who have no sentencing experience. It is apparent, however, that
under the proposed Model Court Rule it is the judge who makes the final decision on
sentencing; although in the case of sentence concessions the master proposes the sentence.
Moreover, under the present system in many jurisdictions, the prosecutor recommends a
sentence which is accepted by the judge in most cases. In view of that practice it seems
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attended by defense counsel, the defendant, the prosecutor and
the court reporter for the purpose of engaging in plea discussions
and reaching plea agreements.
2.2. If either the prosecution or defense indicates an unwilling-
ness to seek a plea agreement, then the master shall obtain a
signed statement from the parties stating only that no agreement is
possible. The statement is to be signed by the master and then
submitted to the judge, and the hearing shall be dismissed. At
arraignment the defendant shall not be prejudiced in his pleading
on the original charges.
2.3. If both prosecution and defense indicate a desire to enter
into plea discussions and seek a fair plea agreement, then the
hearing proceeds as follows:
(a) First the prosecutor and then the defense, separately and in
turn, are to be given an opportunity to present any verbal or
written information, not including witnesses and not subject to the
normal rules of evidence, which includes any information relating
to the crime or crimes charged, the evidence for or against the
defendant, the defendant's background and any other relevant
facts.
(b) The master shall question first the prosecution and then the
defense about the nature of any private discussions which have
occurred between them, in regard to any matters which are un-
clear to him, and in order to elicit any relevant information which
was previously omitted. He shall also inquire of the prosecution
and defense individually about the range of terms of plea agree-
ment which would be acceptable to them.
(c) On the basis of all admitted information, and either at the
original hearing or within a period of no more than two days, the
master shall recommend to the participants one of the following
two alternatives:
(i) That under the circumstances no fair agreement is pos-
sible; and in this case the hearing is dismissed and the defendant
at his scheduled arraignment shall not be prejudiced in his plead-
ing on the original charges, or
preferable to have an objective party-the Master-propose a recommended sentence,
rather than the prosecutor who is also an adversary party with an interest in the outcome
of the proceedings. Regardless of these objections to the use of judges, the alternative of
using judges at the pre-trial hearing would basically preserve the goals and objectives of
the Model Court Rule. Such a system would require a different judge at the arraignment or
point of taking the plea in order to protect the defendant against any potential prejudicial
effect. As a practical matter, it is highly unlikely that any judge at arraignment would reject
his colleague's recommended plea agreement even if it appears unjustified under the
circumstances. Another problem might be that it will prove easier to find and hire masters
than to find sufficient judges; and the costs of salaries would be considerably lower if
masters were employed.
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(ii) That an agreement is appropriate under the circum-
stances, and he shall state the terms of that recommended agree-
ment. The structure of an agreement may take one of the follow-
ing forms:
(A) The prosecutor agrees to make or not to oppose favor-
able recommendations as to the sentence which should be im-
posed if the defendant enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere;
(B) The prosecutor agrees to seek or not to oppose dismissal
of the offense charged if the defendant enters a plea of guilty or
nolo contendere to another offense reasonably related to defend-
ant's conduct; or
(C) The prosecutor agrees to seek or not to oppose dismissal
of other charges or potential charges against the defendant if the
defendant enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. 00
(d) If an agreement is recommended, then it is submitted to all
the participants for their approval and signatures, with the follow-
ing results:
(i) If either the prosecutor or defendant refuses to accept
and sign the recommended agreement, then it shall go back to the
master. He may continue the hearing discussions at his discretion,
or he may directly proceed to propose a second recommended
agreement. If the master fails to propose a second recommended
agreement, or if the second recommended agreement is similarly
rejected by the prosecutor or defendant, then the hearing is dis-
missed and the defendant shall not be prejudiced in his pleading
on the original charges at his arraignment.
(ii) If the prosecution and the defense sign the recommended
agreement then it shall become a valid recommended agreement.
(e) The master shall sign the valid recommended agreement,
including a full transcript of the hearing proceedings and a report
of reasons for the terms of the valid recommended agreement, and
he shall prepare two copies: one to be filed in the office of the
clerk of courts, and one to be sent to the judge for his consid-
eration. The master must state and make clear to all participants
that the agreement reached is not binding on them until the judge
accepts and signs it in his discretion. The master's report of
reasons for the terms of the valid recommended agreement shall
include a discussion of the importance of these factors:
(i) Nature and circumstances of offense charged and arrest.
(ii) Weight of evidence against the defendant and weight of
the defenses available to him.
(iii) Defendant's prior criminal record including arrests and
convictions.
100 These forms are taken from § 3.1 of A.B.A. STANDARDS, supra note 7, at 11.
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(iv) Defendant's past employment, military history, general
background.
(v) Defendant's character and mental condition, both now
and at the time of the alleged crime.
(vi) Defendant's family ties, ties in the community, and his
financial situation.
(f) In the case of any hearing which is prematurely dismissed
and where no valid recommended agreement is reached, the mas-
ter and all participants shall sign a statement indicating only the
final disposition of the hearing. The master shall prepare two
copies of this statement: one to be filed in the office of the clerk of
courts and one statement to be sent to the judge.
(g) The decisions of the master or results of the mandatory
pre-trial hearing are not subject to any direct appellate review.
ARRAIGNMENT:
3.1 Where no valid recommended agreement has been sent to the
judge from the master, then the defendant may plead guilty, nolo
contendere, or not guilty only to the original charges against him;
he may not plead guilty or nolo contendere to any reduced
charges or to a fewer number of counts than were originally
charged against him.
3.2 Where no valid recommended agreement has been sent to the
judge from the master, and the defendant pleads guilty or nolo
contendere to the original charges, then the judge will not accept
any recommendations of sentence from the prosecutor.
3.3 Where a valid recommended agreement has been sent to the
judge prior to arraignment, and he shall have carefully reviewed
and considered that recommended agreement and the reasons for
it prior to arraignment, then the arraignment shall proceed in the
following manner:
(a) First, the judge shall enter into the record the complete
valid recommended agreement and report of the master.
(b) If the judge, in his discretion, states that he rejects the valid
recommended agreement, then he shall briefly state in the record
his reasons for so doing. The judge shall then inquire of the
participants whether they want to attempt to obtain another agree-
ment.
(i) If they so desire, then the matter shall be returned to the
master for a second pre-trial hearing according to the prescribed
process beginning in § 2.3(a).
(ii) However, if the participants do not want to attempt
another agreement or if a valid recommended agreement which
results from the second pre-trial hearing is similarly rejected by
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the judge, then the opportunity for obtaining an agreement will be
exhausted. In this case, the defendant will not be prejudiced in his
pleading on the original charges in accordance with § 3.1 and
§ 3.2. If the defendant chooses to plead guilty or nolo contendere,
then in order to avoid prejudice another judge shall pass sentence
on the defendant; 10 1 and similarly, if he chooses to plead not
guilty, then in order to avoid prejudice another judge shall preside
at his trial. 1
02
(c) Alternatively, if the judge, in his discretion, states that he
accepts the valid recommended agreement, then he shall sign it
and read its terms into the record as a final agreement. The judge
shall inquire individually of all participants whether this final
agreement corresponds to what they signed at the pre-trial hear-
ing.
(i) If the final agreement involves a plea of guilty to reduced
charges or dismissed counts, the prosecutor shall be permitted to
withdraw charges, dismiss charges, and substitute reduced
charges. The defendant shall then enter his plea according to the
various constitutional, statutory, and court-rule requirements de-
signed to ensure that the plea is voluntary and knowing. 0 3 The
judge may give sentence immediately following the taking of the
plea, or in his discretion, may postpone sentencing to a future
date.
(ii) If the final agreement involves a plea of guilty in ex-
change for sentence concessions, the defendant shall then enter
his plea according to the various constitutional, statutory, and
court-rule requirements designed to ensure that it is voluntary and
knowing. The judge shall immediately order the defendant's sen-
tence according to the terms of the agreement.
WITHDRAWAL FROM HEARING OR AGREEMENT:
10 4
4.1 Either the defendant or prosecutor may withdraw at any time
from the pre-trial hearing and thereby terminate it; or withdraw,
until the plea is entered, from a recommended agreement, or a
101 This provision is meant to avoid the issue of self-incrimination (U.S. CONST. amend.
V) at sentencing, because of the information resulting from the hearing, including perhaps
hearsay evidence, which the judge has read in the master's report.
02 The possibility of prejudice to the defendant is noted in PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME 136.
10 3 The procedure for receiving the plea may be those which are presently in use in the
jurisdiction or preferably those in §§ 1.1- 1.8 of A.B.A. STANDARDS, supra note 7, at 6-9.
But note that they would have to be slightly modified in order to fit within the proposed
procedure of the Model Court Rule.
04 See also § 2.1-2.2 in A.B.A. STANDARDS, supra note 7, at 9-10, dealing with




valid recommended agreement, or a final agreement and thereby
invalidate such agreement.
DISCUSSION AND AGREEMENT NOT ADMISSIBLE: 10 5
5.1 Unless the defendant subsequently enters a plea of guilty or
nolo contendere which is not withdrawn, neither the fact that the
defendant or his counsel and the prosecutor engaged in a
pre-trial hearing for plea discussion or entered into a plea agree-
ment, nor any terms of or reasons for the agreement should be
received in evidence against or in favor of the defendant in any
criminal or civil action or administrative proceedings.
INCONSISTENT RULES:
6.1 All rules or parts of existing rules which are inconsistent with
this rule are henceforth invalid and inoperative.
C. Procedural Innovations
The effect of this proposal would be to formalize the plea
bargaining process, so as to make it a regular part of the proce-
dure in every criminal case. Emphasis is on full disclosure of all
discussions, terms of the agreements, and reasons for recommend-
ed bargains. Thus the system proposed here goes farther than the
safeguards and standards, merely palliative measures, which are
proposed in the American Bar Association's Project on Minimum
Standards for Criminal Justice: Standards Relating to Pleas of
Guilty.106 Many abuses can be eliminated only through a struc-
tural revision of plea bargaining altering its pronounced tendency
to favor the prosecution. This is in part accomplished by reducing
the tremendous discretion now lodged with the prosecutor.
Two components are at the heart of the proposed procedure:
first, a mandatory pre-trial hearing conducted by a master (or
judge), who will gather all facts and recommend an agreement
to the parties for their approval and subsequently to the judge for
his consideration; and second, a formal court procedure whereby
the proposed agreement, including data and conclusions from the
master, are officially entered into the record in full.
1. The Mandatory Pre-Trial Hearing-A pre-trial hearing is
105 This section is adopted from § 3.4 in A.B.A. STANDARDS, supra note 7, at 12.
106 A.B.A. STANDARDS, supra note 7, §§ 3.1-4. See The Unconstitutionality of Plea
Bargaining, supra note 28, at 1395, which criticizes these standards and concludes: "The
ABA's proposed reforms attempt to ensure that defendants make voluntary and accurate
pleas by prescribing a 'due process' of plea bargaining. But the discretion afforded the
prosecutor, defendant and defense counsel in reaching a decision remains substantially
unimpaired. The proposals may curb the most severe abuses, but they do not greatly
influence the essential components of the plea bargaining process."
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often required in the civil procedure of many jurisdictions and
would seem to lend itself well to the system of criminal proce-
dure. 10 7 However, since the criminal charge involves a public
interest'0 8 which is generally more significant than the litigation
between two private parties, the negotiation of a criminal case
demands special pre-trial procedures. In plea bargaining the pub-
lic interest in a fair bargain is too often overpowered by the
intense adversary nature of the system. It is therefore proposed
that every criminal case' 09 within a jurisdiction should be manda-
torily referred to a master 110 for pre-trial hearing as soon as
possible after the information or indictment is issued, and the
equivalent of a pre-sentence report is available. Bargaining is
mandatory in order to provide every defendant with an equal
opportunity to bargain. The hearing is placed under the close
scrutiny and direction of an objective administrator to ensure
fairness, in part, simply by removing the discretion to dictate
terms from the prosecutor who also functions as the defendant's
adversary.1 1 ' Although "bargain justice" is still dispensed, a
pre-trial hearing conducted by an actively participating, in-
dependent party should provide a more rational basis for deter-
mining the disposition of a defendant's case than the present
system.
The Model Rule provides that no rules of evidence should limit
what is admitted or heard at the hearing."x 2 This provision serves
the purpose of the hearing which is to determine a fair agreement
based upon all information about the. crime, evidence for and
against the defendant, and the defendant's background."x 3 Since
1
0 7 E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 16, and various state rules which are modeled after the federal
rule. The purpose of such hearings is to try to settle the case, to guarantee that the parties
have complied with the discovery rules, and to sharpen the issues for trial.
108 "A plea negotiation is fundamentally a negotiation about the correctional disposition
of a case and is, therefore, a matter of moment to the community as well as to the
defendant." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME 136.
109 Of course, if the defendant pleads guilty to the original charge and takes his chances
on a sentence, then he would waive any opportunity to obtain a negotiated plea.
'
10 The title is not critical; it could be a commissioner, or a clerk, or referee. However,
such a person must have at least a law degree and preferably some practical experience in
criminal law, or a background in sociology or psychology, It is suggested that perhaps law
clerks for judges within the jurisdiction might be attractive candidates for such a job when
they complete their clerking assignments. The master could be a judge if under a rotat-
ing-docket system.
11 The hearing represents the only opportunity for the parties to obtain a negotiated
plea. In this respect the procedure here is similar to the new procedural system in Detroit
Recorder's Court, as described in Cahalan, supra note 23, at 332-33.
112 Model Court Rule § 2.3(a).
113 The ideal method of obtaining this information, especially that concerning the defend-
ant's correctional needs, would be through an advance pre-sentence report. See PRESI-
DENT'S COMMISSION, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME 135-36; Note, The Presentence Re-
port:An Empirical Study of its Use in the Federal Criminal Process, 58 GEO. L. J. 451,
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the hearing is primarily a fact-finding proceeding rather than a
judicial proceeding, it should not be restricted by rules which are
appropriate only for the latter. Although signed affidavits would
be admissible under this policy, the Model Rule expressly pro-
vides that no outside witness shall be allowed to testify.114 This
requirement is not inconsistent with the nature and purpose of the
hearing, for if witnesses were permitted to appear and be
cross-examined the result would be similar to a trial proceeding. If
the goal is to avoid a lengthy and burdensome procedure, then the
hearing should be limited to testimony of the interested parties
and any written evidence which they may present.
This presentation of information by the prosecution and de-
fense, on its face, constitutes a form of pre-trial discovery. The
extent to which such discovery should be permitted has been a
controversial issue. 115 While the commentators have argued pro
and con, it appears that the trend is now towards more liberal
pre-trial discovery in criminal cases.
116
One limitation on discovery which is encountered at the outset
is that the parties are not required to seek a bargain. Con-
sequently no one is required to reveal any information. Even if the
parties do decide to seek a plea agreement, there are no require-
ments on either side as to what must be exposed in the discussion,
other than the implicit requirement that sufficient information be
available to justify a favorable bargain. Since the hearing is con-
ducted under oath, the parties are not permitted to falsify the facts
which they do reveal. Moreover, there is a built-in incentive for
the parties to reveal at least the minimal amount of information
necessary for the master to suggest an agreement (assuming, of
course, that the parties are interested in reaching an agreement).
461-70 (1970). The probation department or pre-sentence division or other court agency
which usually prepares the pre-sentence reports could speed up its processes by hiring
more investigators who can gather information earlier in the criminal proceedings. They
will gather as much dispositional information as possible in the time available by talking to
friends, neighbors, witnesses, and family of the defendant. The chance for pre-trial witness
tampering or dishonest witnesses under this proposed procedure is no greater than under
the present system, in which the defense and prosecution go out or send out investigators
to talk to witnesses. The goal is to make sentencing and the determination of charges to
which the defendant will plead guilty, more meaningful and responsive to the defendant's
correctional needs. The complete and frank exchange of information at the hearing is
called for in PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME 135.
114 Model Court Rule § 2.3(a).
115 See, e.g., Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in State Criminal Cases, 12 STAN. L. REV.
293 (1960); Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal
Procedure, 69 YALE L. J. 1149, 1172-98 (1960); Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma
Real or Apparent?, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 56 (1961).
1
16 See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Criminal Procedure for
the United States District Courts, 48 F.R.D. 553, 587 (1970). "Rule 16 [discovery and
inspection] is revised to give greater discovery to both the prosecution and the defense."
Id. 595.
SPRING 197 1I]
Journal of Law Reform
This kind of discovery does not seem to be any more bur-
densome on the parties than the informal exchanges of in-
formation between prosecutor and defense, which now take place
when they negotiate a plea. Indeed, the primary difference is that,
in the hearing, they will be dealing at arms length. Moreover, any
discovery under the Model Court Rule would tend to be evenly
applied, with both prosecutor and defendant exposing part or all
of their case. Finally, since this pre-trial discovery is limited, if a
case goes on to trial, the parties will not then be precluded from
employing the usual discovery devices like a bill of particulars, or
request for scientific information in order to obtain detailed data
which is necessary for trial preparation.
2. Procedure at Arraignment: Incorporation into the
Record-At the arraignment it is the judge's duty to enter into the
record the full plea agreement and report 1 7 which were sent to
him by the master (or other judge). This will occur only where
there is a valid recommended agreement which was signed by the
prosecution and defense. The requirement of incorporating the
terms of the agreement into the record in court, an integral part of
the procedure, is widely advocated by courts and com-
mentators.118 Some of the reasons offered to support the require-
ment of disclosure in open court have been articulated in support
of the more restrictive A.B.A. Standards119 and include the fol-
lowing: it is important for the judge's determination of the volun-
tariness of a plea; it reduces risk of an unfair agreement; it
enhances public confidence in the administration of justice; and it
makes direct appellate review meaningful.' 20 In addition, a record
of agreements would prevent misunderstandings about whether
promises were really made and accusations by defendants of
unfulfilled bargains or unkept promises by the prosecutor or court.
117The master's report, which includes the master's reasons for recommending the
particular terms of the agreement, is similar in spirit to the requirement that the prosecutor
submit to the court his reasons for recommending a plea of guilty to a lesser offense. N.Y.
CODE CRIM. PROC. § 342-a (McKinney 1966), repealed by the new Criminal Procedure
Law § 220.10 (to be effective Sept. 1, 1971).
1
18 
See Jones v. United States, 423 F.2d 252, 255-56 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
839 (1970); United States v. Williams, 407 F.2d 940, 948-49 (4th Cir. 1969); People v.
Byrd, 12 Mich. App. 186, 229 n.58, 162 N.W.2d 777 (1968). See also TASK FORCE
REPORT 12; Enker, supra note 8, at 118; Bongiovanni, supra note 14, at 548; Recent
Development, 17 STAN. L. REV. 316, 320 (1965); Underwood, Let's Put Plea Dis-
cussions-and Agreements-on Record, I LOYOLA U.L.J. 1 (1970); PRESIDENT'S COM-
MISSION, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME 136.
119 Under these standards an agreement will be placed into the record only if the judge
can elicit its existence and terms from the prosecutor and defense counsel, A.B.A.
STANDARDS, supra note 7, § 1.5 at 8.
120Jones v. United States, 423 F.2d 252, 255-56 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 839
(1970). There is some belief that it would also reduce the number of appeals and
post-conviction proceedings stemming from plea bargaining, and that it would simplify
them. Underwood, supra note I 18, at 5-6, 8- 11.
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It should be emphasized that under this system the pre-trial
hearing is the only opportunity in the proceedings for the parties
to reach an agreement. To facilitate this policy, the judge is
prohibited from accepting a guilty plea to reduced or dismissed
charges, or any sentence recommendations unless they are in-
cluded within an official agreement.' 2 ' The remainder of the
procedure at arraignment includes the acceptance of the plea and
the usual practices for satisfying the constitutional requirements
of a voluntary and knowing plea.
D. Proper Roles of the Judge and Participants
1. Trial Judge-Under the proposed procedure the trial judge
is clearly not a participant in the plea discussions or in any
proceeding before a valid recommended agreement is determined.
This judicial insulation from the bargaining process has been
emphatically recommended by many judges and commentators as
a necessary reform of the present system. 122 Once the agreement
comes to light, however, it is recognized that the judge has a duty
to examine the fairness of the agreement which results from
negotiations and to ratify it in open court.123 In reconciling the
fear of judicial pressure with the need for judicial scrutiny, the
best approach would seem to be for the judge to be excluded from
any bargaining or discussions, and then once an agreement is
121 Model Court Rule §§ 3.1, 3.2.
122See Brown v. Beto, 377 F.2d 950, 956-57 (5th Cir. 1967); Sco.tt v. United States,
419 F.2d 264 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F.Supp. 244,
(S.D.N.Y. 1966); Commonwealth v. Evans, 434 Pa. 52, 252 A.2d 689 (1969), holding that
any participation by a trial judge in the plea bargaining process prior to trial is forbidden;
State v. Byrd, 203 Kan. 45, 453 P.2d 22, 27 (1969); People v. Earegood, 12 Mich. App.
256, 162 N.W.2d 802 (1968); Commonwealth v. Lynch, 210 Pa. Super. 172, 231 A.2d
880, 883 (1967).
In some cases members of the judiciary have been criticized for participating in plea
bargaining by persuading defendants to plead guilty: Smith v. United States, 321 F.2d 954
(9th Cir. 1963); United States ex rel. McGrath v. La Vallee, 319 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1963);
Euziere v. United States, 249 F.2d 293 (10th Cir. 1957). But cf. People v. Williams 269
Cal. App. 879, 75 Cal. Rptr. 348, 351-52 (1969) (describing the proper conduct for a
judge who does participate in plea bargaining). See also PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME 136; Recent Development, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1082 (1967); Com-
ment, Official Inducements to Plead Guilty: Suggested Morals For A Marketplace, 32 U.
CHI. L. REV. 167, 187 (1964). But see Enker, supra note 8, at 117- 18, allowing for some
judicial involvement in the process; Underwood, supra note 118, at 5, permitting judicial
participation in plea discussions only as a practical necessity. For a discussion of the
judge's involvement in the bargaining process in the English system, see Thomas, Plea
Bargaining and the Turner Case, 1970 CRIM. L. REV., 559, 562-65.
123 Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 275 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States ex rel.
Thurmond v. Mancusi, 275 F.Supp. 508, 517 (E.D.N.Y. 1967); State v. Johnson, 279
Minn. 209, 215-16, 156 N.W.2d 218, 223 (1968), -[t]he ultimate judicial responsibility
must be to make reasonably certain that a person innocent of any crime has not been
improperly induced to plead guilty to a crime." This procedure is in accord with the
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME 136, stating that the agreed
disposition should be openly acknowledged and fully presented to the judge for his review
and acceptance before the plea is entered.
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reached, to assess and indicate his acceptance or rejection of the
agreement before the plea is entered. A similar position is taken
by the American Bar Association in its recommendations. 124
The primary consideration underlying a policy or rule excluding
the trial judge from any plea discussions has to do with the
disparity in bargaining power which would result. 125 The trial
judge, because of his position of power over the defendant's case,
would be in a position in which his presence might implicitly
coerce or threaten the defendant. 126 However, this reasoning does
not preclude the participation of a judge instead of a master in the
pre-trial hearing, if the judge is on a rotating-docket system so
that he will not subsequently take the plea or preside at trial. 127
A guideline suggested for the judge who reviews the agreement
is that he should weigh the terms of the agreement against stan-
dards similar to those that would be applied on imposition of
sentence after a trial. He may therefore consider such things as
"the defendant's need for correctional treatment; the circum-
stances of the case; the defendant's co-operation; and the require-
ments of law enforcement."'1 28 Under the procedure offered in the
Model Court Rule, if the master's report is complete, the judge
should find it relatively easy to review it in terms of these consid-
erations.
2. The Prosecutor- Because of the mandatory pre-trial hear-
ing and the participation of the master, the prosecutor's discretion
in the negotiation process has been considerably reduced. Since it
is the master who recommends the bargain to the prosecutor and
defense at the hearing, the prosecutor cannot otherwise recom-
mend reduced or dropped charges or sentence concessions in
return for a guilty plea. The prosecutor nonetheless plays an
important role in the process, for he helps to set the boundaries of
the range of dispositions from which the master must choose. In
serving this function, the prosecutor's office could formulate gen-
eral policies concerning initial charging of defendants and the
124 See A.B.A. STANDARDS § 3.3 (Revised), supra note 7, at 11- 12.
125 See Gentile, supra note 52, at 524-26. See also Recent Development, supra note
122, at 1087-90, discussing judicial plea bargaining as compared to prosecutorial plea
bargaining.
126 Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 273-74 (D.C. Cir. 1969); PRESIDENT'S COM-
MISSION, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME 135. A third alternative regarding the judge's role is
the system in which the judge has power on his own to lower or drop charges, without any
discussions at all. See Alschuler, supra note i3. However, this proposal is not desirable for
at least three reasons: it allows the trial judge too much discretion; removes too much of
the adversary nature from the proceedings; and would not be practical or efficient, since
the judge in order to make a wise decision would have to spend too much time in obtaining
and scrutinizing information about the defendant and the crime.
127 See discussion in note 99 supra.
128 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME 136.
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kinds of agreements they will accept for particular kinds of crimes
and defendants. This will help to promote an equality of treatment
of defendants, ensure uniformity and contribute to a better public
image for the discussions.
3. Defense Counsel-Although there is presently no con-
stitutional requirement that a defendant must be represented by
an attorney at any kind of plea discussions, 129 the better policy
suggests that negotiations should only be conducted if an attorney
is present at the hearing.130 In any event, the defendant should not
enter a guilty plea without a prior consultation with counsel.'
3 '
Since in most instances the defendant will not be intimately famil-
iar with the law, and because of the quasi-adversary nature of the
proceedings, a defense attorney's presence at plea discussions
should provide greater fairness in the process.
The defendant needs a lawyer in the course of plea bargaining
to explain all the alternatives available to him including the
different possibilities of conviction or various leniencies, and the
fact that neither the defense lawyer, prosecutor, nor master can
bargain for or bind the court. 3 2 Moreover, defense counsel
should ensure that his client is not an innocent man who has been
coerced or intimidated into accepting a plea agreement.' 33
12- Assuming that a felony was involved, the issue would be whether or not the plea
discussion stage, here the mandatory pre-trial hearing, is a critical stage in the criminal
process at which the defendant would be prejudiced without effective assistance of coun-
sel. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). The United States Supreme Court has
held that the trial is such a critical stage (Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1962)), as
is the guilty plea (Doughty v. Maxwell, 376 U.S. 202 (1964)) and the preliminary hearing
(Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970)). In Anderson v. North Carolina, 221 F. Supp.
930 (W.D.N.C. 1963), the court held that the defendant was denied his constitutional ight
to counsel, where he was indicted for a capital crime and the prosecutor, with the consent
of defendant's counsel but in the absence of his counsel, talked with the defendant in jail
and induced him to plead guilty to a lesser offense. The court relied on Powell, supra, and
indicated that the defendant was entitled to have counsel aid him in making a decision in
the course of plea negotiations. 221 F. Supp. at 934-35. According to Judge Skelly
Wright: "A lawyer balances plea bargaining. Like the confrontation in the station house,
plea bargaining is an adversary proceeding-a critical stage in the criminal process where a
lawyer is required." Wright, supra note 13, at 1120.
'30 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME 11; Note, Guilty Plea Bar-
gaining: Compromises by Prosecutors to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 865,
885-89 (1964).
131 Commonwealth ex rel. Kerekes v. Maroney, 423 Pa. 337, 350, 223 A.2d 699,
705-06 (1966). See also A.B.A. STANDARDS § 3.2(a), supra note 7, at I I which states:
"Defense counsel should conclude a plea agreement only with the consent of the defend-
ant, and should ensure that the decision whether to enter a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere is ultimately made by the defendant."
132 See Cortez v. United States, 337 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 1964). See also A.B.A.
STANDARDS § 3.2(b), supra note 7, at II, which states: "To aid the defendant in reaching a
decision, defense counsel, after appropriate investigation, should advise the defendant of
the alternatives available and of considerations deemed important by him or the defendant
in reaching a decision."
133 United States v. Rogers, 289 F.Supp. 726, 730 (D.C. Conn. 1968): "But guilty pleas
and plea bargaining place a heavy responsibility on defense counsel to ensure that neither
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IV. CONCLUSION
The present system of bargained guilty pleas provides neither
the substance nor appearance of justice, and fails to promote the
rehabilitative, protective, and deterrent effects of the substantive
criminal law. Hopefully, future experience with the kind of pro-
posal submitted here for plea bargaining will eliminate abuses of
the present system by reducing prosecutorial discretion, in-
creasing public visibility and interjecting an independent adminis-
trative functionary. In terms of extra input of resources the pro-
posed procedure only requires earlier pre-sentence reports, the
hiring of masters to supervise the hearings, and the salaries of
court reporters for the hearings. Thus, the costs are relatively low.
The benefits should include: greater efficiency in disposing of
cases; less chance for the prosecutor to abuse his discretion; high
visibility of the process; the master's preparation of a fair recom-
mended agreement as a built-in disincentive to overcharging; and
a guilty plea based on a fair agreement which will be more im-
mune from attack at the appellate level.
- Kenneth A. Kraus
the rights or interests of defendants .. are thereby jeopardized. This means that defense
attorneys ...must exercise scrupulous care to see to it that an innocent man does not
plead guilty."
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